

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 IAEA V 05114 01 OF 02 100112Z

63

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 NSC-07 NSCE-00 PM-03 CIAE-00

INR-10 NSAE-00 RSC-01 DODE-00 IO-03 L-02 PRS-01 SP-01

SAJ-01 EUR-10 SCI-03 FEA-02 ARA-10 EA-13 DRC-01 /093 W

----- 092115

P R 092302Z JUN 74

FM USMISSION IAEA VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4522

INFO AEC GERMANTOWN

USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 IAEA VIENNA 5114

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: TECH, PFOR, IN

SUBJECT: VIEWS OF INDIAN AMBASSADOR JAIPAL ON INDIAN NUCLEAR
EXPLOSION

1. THE FOLLOWING REPORTS PRIVATE DISCUSSION WHICH
AMBASSADOR PORTER AND I HAD WITH AMBASSADOR JAIPAL ON
JUNE 6, PURPOSE OF WHICH WAS TO EXPLORE HIS VIEWS ON WHAT
MIGHT BE DONE TO ASSURE THAT THE INDIAN NUCLEAR TEST DID
NOT CONTRIBUTE TO FURTHER PROLIFERATION.

2. WE STARTED DISCUSSION BY MAKING SEVERAL POINTS. IT
WAS APPARENT THAT THERE HAD BEEN A STRONG WORLD REACTION
TO INDIA'S NEW NUCLEAR STATUS. PRIORITIES IN USE OF
INDIA'S RESOURCES, COOPERATION WITH OTHERS IN ATOMIC
ENERGY, MILITARY INTENTIONS AND CREDIBILITY IN GENERAL
WERE BEING QUESTIONED. WE DID NOT ATTEMPT TO ASSESS THE
IMPORTANCE OF THIS REACTION BY JAIPAL ADMITTED THAT IT

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 IAEA V 05114 01 OF 02 100112Z

WOULD HURT.

(A) IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT INDIA'S PRIORITIES ARE A MATTER FOR INDIA; HOWEVER, GRANTORS OF AID APPEAR TO BE HIGHLY INFLUENCED BY A COUNTRY'S PRIORITIES IN USE OF ITS OWN SCARCE RESOURCES.

(B) NO INFORMED OBSERVER COULD ACCEPT THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN A PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICE AND A WEAPON. ONCE INDIA POSSESSED THE CAPACITY TO CREATE A NUCLEAR EXPLOSION THE QUESTION OF FUTURE USE OR DEVELOPMENT OF SUCH DEVICES WOULD BE DETERMINED BY FUTURE EVENTS AND NOT PRESENT INTENTIONS, NO MATTER HOW SINCERE.

(C) INDIAN ACCESS TO FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY WAS BOUND TO BE RESTRICTED AS THE CANADIAN DECISION HAD ALREADY MADE CLEAR. A GROUP OF NUCLEAR EXPORTERS, THE SO-CALLED ZANGGER COMMITTEE, WOULD SHORTLY BE MAKING FINAL DECISIONS ON AN AGREED LIST OF ITEMS OF NUCLEAR EQUIPMENT, THE EXPORT OF WHICH WOULD REQUIRE APPLICATION OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS IN THE RECEIVING COUNTRY. THIS LIST, TOGETHER WITH THE PROHIBITION OF EXPORT OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL IN THE ABSENCE OF SAFEGUARDS, AS PROVIDED BY ARTICLE III.2 OF THE NPT, WOULD MAKE IT MANDATORY THAT INDIA WOULD HAVE TO ACCEPT AGENCY SAFEGUARDS, LIMIT ITS PURCHASES ESSENTIALLY TO FRANCE, OR RELY ENTIRELY ON INDIGENOUS R&D AND PRODUCTION. EVEN FRANCE WOULD PROBABLY INSIST ON SAFEGUARDS ON SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL EXPORTED TO INDIA.

(D) WE HAD NOTICED INDIAN ASSURANCE RE THE PEACEFUL PURPOSES OF THE EXPLOSION AND THE SOLEMN INTENT NOT TO DEVELOP A NUCLEAR WEAPON. WE HAD HEARD NO INDIAN ASSURANCE WITH RESPECT TO PROLIFERATION. IN FACT, STATEMENTS MADE BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND OTHER LEADERS CARRIED THE IMPLICATION THAT INDIA WAS EAGER TO EXPORT ITS TECHNOLOGY WITH NO ASSURANCE THAT THIS WOULD NOT ULTIMATELY LEAD TO THE DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING OF NUCLEAR DEVICES IN OTHER COUNTRIES NOT PARTY TO THE NPT. WE HAD OBSERVED THAT INDIA HAD ALREADY SIGNED A COOPERATION AGREEMENT WITH ARGENTINA, A COUNTRY WHICH HAD NOT RATIFIED THE NPT AND WHICH RESERVED THE RIGHT TO HAVE ITS OWN PNE PROGRAM. A SIMILAR OFFER HAD BEEN MADE TO BRAZIL. EVEN IF INDIA WOULD NOT PROVIDE DEVICE TECHNOLOGY TO OTHERS, THE PROBLEM WAS TO CONTROL TRANSFER OF THAT RELEVANT TECHNOLOGY WHICH WOULD ENABLE OTHERS TO FOLLOW THE INDIAN PATH.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 IAEA V 05114 01 OF 02 100112Z

3. THE GIST OF JAIPAL'S COMMENTARY WAS:

(A) THERE IS NO QUESTION ABOUT THE PEACEFUL INTENTIONS OF THE PRESENT INDIAN GOVERNMENT. HE WOULD REAFFIRM THIS STRONGLY AT THE UP-COMING BOARD OF GOVERNORS MEETING AND STATE CATEGORICALLY THAT A WEAPONS PROGRAM WAS RULE OUT. HE ADMITTED THAT THIS WAS THE VIEW OF THE PRESENT PRIME MINISTER AND HE RECOGNIZED

THAT OTHER COUNTRIES MIGHT BE CONCERNED WITH THE
TRANSIENT NATURE OF SUCH ASSURANCES.

(B) HE THOUGHT OUR QUESTION WITH RESPECT TO INDIAN
POLICY ON NOT CONTRIBUTING TO FURTHER PROLIFERATION WAS
VALID. THIS WAS A LEGITIMATE SUBJECT TO BE DISCUSSED
WITH GOI.. HE STRESSED THE COMMERCIAL IMPORTANCE OF THE
INDIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM IN TERMS OF EXPORT POTENTIAL AND
THE POLITICAL VALUE TO BE GAINED BY COOPERATIVE VENTURES
WITH OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR FIELD, BUT
HE STATED AS HIS PERSONAL VIEW HIS CONFIDENCE THAT INDIA
DID NOT KNOWINGLY INTEND TO PROLIFERATE OR TO EXPORT
SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL WITHOUT ADEQUATE CONTROLS. THE
ARGENTINE AGREEMENT, HE SAID, WAS NOT A CAUSE FOR ALARM.
IT WAS NOT INTENDED TO LEAD TO EXPORT OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSION
TECHNOLOGY.

(C) HE WAS INTERESTED IN THE COMMITMENTS OF THE
NUCLEAR EXPORTING STATES WHICH HAD BEEN DEVELOPED IN THE
ZANGGER COMMITTEE AND CONJECTURED WHETHER OR NOT INDIA
MIGHT CONSIDER ASSOCIATING ITSELF IN SOME WAY WITH A
SIMILAR COMMITMENT NOT TO EXPORT NUCLEAR MATERIAL OR
EQUIPMENT WITHOUT SAFEGUARDS.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 IAEA V 05114 02 OF 02 100101Z

63

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 NSC-07 NSCE-00 PM-03 CIAE-00

INR-10 NSAE-00 RSC-01 DODE-00 IO-03 L-02 PRS-01 SP-01

EUR-10 SCI-03 FEA-02 ARA-10 EA-13 DRC-01 /092 W

----- 092080

P R 092302Z JUN 74

FM USMISSION IAEA VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4523

INFO AEC GERMANTOWN

USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 IAEA VIENNA 5114

LIMDIS

4. IN THE GENERAL DISCUSSION WE HAD ON THE BACKGROUND OF THE INDIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM AS WELL AS THE DECISION LEADING TO THE RECENT NUCLEAR TEST, JAIPAL MADE SEVERAL GENERAL POINTS:

(A) HE WAS TOTALLY UNAWARE OF THE DECISION TO TEST. HE HAD PERSONALLY ASSUMED THAT INDIA WOULD NOT DO SO. THIS SUGGESTED SOME WISHFUL THINKING, HE ADMITTED.

(B) IN THE COURSE OF A RATHER LONG EXPOSE OF INDIA'S CURRENT PROBLEMS HE LEFT THE STRONG IMPRESSION THAT HE VIEWED THE TIMING OF THE TEST DECISION AS PRIMARILY DESIGNED TO BOOST SAGGING MORALE AND TO STRENGTHEN THE PRIMIN'S POSITION. DESPITE THE STRONG VIEWS OF THE RIGHTISTS WITH RESPECT TO DEVELOPING A NUCLEAR WEAPON CAPABILITY, HE THOUGHT MRS. GHANDI WAS INFLUENCED PRIMARILY BY DOMESTIC RATHER THAN FOREIGN POLICY CONSIDERATIONS. HE WAS CONVINCED SHE HAD NO INTENTION OF DEVELOPING A WEAPON.

(C) HE NOTED THE TEST REQUIRED ONLY A SMALL AMOUNT
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 IAEA V 05114 02 OF 02 100101Z

OF PLUTONIUM--HE THOUGHT 5 KG--AND BELIEVED THE PLUTONIUM FOR THE TEST CAME FROM THE APSARA RESEARCH REACTOR. HE STRESSED THAT PLUTONIUM FROM THE CIRUS REACTOR HAD BEEN SET ASIDE FOR USE IN THE FAST-BREEDER PROGRAM.

(D) HE EMPHASIZED THE SMALL AMOUNT OF PLUTONIUM WHICH WAS AND WILL BE AVAILABLE AS EVIDENCE THAT A NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR PNE PROGRAM OF ANY MAGNITUDE COULD NOT BE CONTEMPLATED. WHEN WE POINTED OUT THAT THE KALPAKKAM REACTORS NEAR MADRAS WOULD BE UNSAFEGUARDED AND PRODUCE PERHAPS HUNDREDS OF KILOGRAMS OF PLUTONIUM ANNUALLY, HE CONCEDED THE POINT BUT SAID THIS WAS STILL MANY YEARS AWAY AND HAD BEEN FURTHER DELAYED BY THE WITHDRAWAL OF CANADIAN SUPPORT.

(E) HE LAID STRESS ON THEIR LIMITED URANIUM RESOURCES AND THE ESSENTIALITY OF THE SUCCESS OF THE FAST BREEDER PROGRAM FOR THE FUTURE ENERGY REQUIREMENTS OF INDIA AND FELT SURE THAT SCARCE INDIAN RESOURCES WOULD BE CONCENTRATED ON THIS PROGRAM, WHICH WOULD UTILIZE ALL AVAILABLE PLUTONIUM.

5. JAIPAL ACCEPTED THAT INDIA MUST DO SOMETHING TO RE-ESTABLISH INTERNATIONAL CREDIBILITY WITH RESPECT TO ITS ANNOUNCED PEACEFUL NUCLEAR INTENTIONS, BOTH RE ITS DOMESTIC PROGRAM AND THE DOUBTS THAT EXISTED ON ITS WILLINGNESS NOT TO CONTRIBUTE TO PROLIFERATION IN OTHER COUNTRIES. GIVEN INDIAN SENSITIVITIES TO OUTSIDE CRITICISM AND GIVEN THE PRIME MINISTER'S DIRECT PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT

IN THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM, HE FELT THAT THE US SHOULD APPROACH THE PRIME MINISTER DIRECTLY AND IN CONFIDENCE, SETTING FORTH OUR CONCERNS AND SUGGESTING POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION. HE STRONGLY ADVISED AGAINST DISCUSSING THE MATTER AT ANY OTHER LEVEL OTHER THAN THAT OF THE PRIME MINISTER. ALL THE MINISTERS CONCERNED, HE THOUGHT, MIGHT HAVE SELF-SERVING OR NEGATIVE REACTIONS WHICH WOULD MISS THE POINT--NAMELY, THAT INDIA MUST ENGAGE HERSELF IN COMMITMENTS WHICH WOULD RE-ESTABLISH HER CREDIBILITY AND REMOVE THE UNCERTAINTIES CREATED BY THE NUCLEAR TEST. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE MENTIONED KOSYGIN'S CLEAR STATEMENT OF OCCASION OF AUSTRIAN PM KREISKY'S RECENT MOSCOW VISIT, THAT SOVIETS ACCEPTED PM GHANDI'S ASSURANCES RE THE PEACEFUL NATURE OF THE INDIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM AT SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 IAEA V 05114 02 OF 02 100101Z

FACE VALUE. THIS, EMPHASIZED JAIPAL, SHOULD BE AS CLEARLY STATED BY THE US AS IT WAS BY THE SOVIETS, WHEN APPROACHING MRS. GHANDI. HE ADDED THAT HE HAD SENT IN HIS OWN ANALYSIS SEVERAL DAYS AGO WHICH CLOSELY PARALLELED THE CONSIDERATIONS WHICH WE HAD COVERED IN THE DISCUSSION.

6. COMMENT: AS WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED, JAIPAL, WHO WILL SHORTLY LEAVE VIENNA AS THE NEW INDIAN AMBASSADOR IN NEW YORK, WAS A PROPONENT OF INDIAN RATIFICATION OF THE NPT. HE BELIEVES THAT THE NPT WAS INDEED DISCRIMINATORY BUT NONTHELESS FELT THAT IT WAS IN INDIAN OVERALL INTEREST TO ADHERE TO THE TREATY. HIS VIEWS MAY, OF COURSE, BE CONSIDERED TOO DOVISH BY MANY IN DELHI AND WE HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE AS TO WHETHER HE HAS A PERSONAL INFLUENCE IN POLICY FORMULATION IN THIS AREA. HOWEVER, HIS VIEWS ARE LOGICAL, AND ARE CERTAINLY GEARED TO US POLICY OBJECTIVES RE NON-PROLIFERATION AS WE SEE THEM FROM HERE. I STRONGLY ENDORSE THAT AN EFFORT BE MADE TO GET INDIA TO CONSIDER WHAT STEPS SHE CAN TAKE TO CONTAIN THE DAMAGE CAUSED BY HER NUCLEAR TEST. WE WILL PROVIDE FOR THE DEPARTMENT'S CONSIDERATION SOME RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH MIGHT BE USED BY SECRETARY DURING PROBABLE VISIT TO INDIA. TAPE

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL, NUCLEAR WEAPONS, NUCLEAR BOMBS, NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES, NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS, NUCLEAR FUELS, NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS, NUCLEAR TESTS, P EACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 09 JUN 1974
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974IAEAV05114
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D740148-0105
From: IAEA VIENNA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740661/aaaacaty.tel
Line Count: 265
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: LIMDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 19 MAR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <19 MAR 2002 by kelleyw0>; APPROVED <08 MAY 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: VIEWS OF INDIAN AMBASSADOR JAIPAL ON INDIAN NUCLEAR EXPLOSION
TAGS: TECH, PFOR, IN, (JAIPAL)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005